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COMPOSITION	AS	IDENTITY	AND	PLURAL	CANTOR’S	THEOREM	Einar	Duenger	Bohn	University	of	Agder	[Forthcoming	in	a	special	issue	of	Logic	and	Logical	Philosophy]		Let	Composition	as	Identity	(CAI)	be	the	thesis	that	a	whole	is	identical	with	all	its	parts	 collectively,	 not	 individually.1	For	 a	 toy	 example,	 let	my	body	be	 a	whole	composed	 of	 some	parts,	 say	my	 arms,	 legs,	 head	 and	 torso.	 Then,	 by	 CAI,	my	body	is	identical	with	my	arms,	legs,	head	and	torso	collectively,	but	not	with	any	one	of	them	individually.			 Plural	 Cantor’s	 Theorem	 (PCT)	 is	 the	 proposition	 that	 for	 any	 plurality	containing	 two	 or	 more	 members,	 there	 are	 more	 sub-pluralities	 of	 it	 than	members.2 	For	 a	 toy	 example,	 consider	 you	 and	 me.	 That	 plurality	 has	 2	members:	 you	 and	me,	 but	 22-1	 sub-pluralities:	 you,	me,	 and	 you-and-me.	 The	point	generalizes:	 for	any	plurality	with	n	members,	 it	has	2n-1	sub-pluralities,	which	is	strictly	greater	than	n,	provided	n>1.				 It	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 well-known	 fact	 among	 philosophers	 working	 on	 the	topic	that	CAI	blocks	PCT,	but,	unfortunately,	it	has	so	far	been	neither	formally	shown	nor	 fully	 appreciated	 in	print.3	So,	 in	what	 follows,	 I	 first	 show	 in	 some	detail	how	my	favorite	version	of	CAI	blocks	PCT	(section	1).	Second,	to	see	some																																																									1	See	especially	Lewis	(1991:3.6);	Sider	(2007);	Wallace	(2009,	2011);	Bohn	(2009,	2011,	2014);	Cotnoir	(2013);	and	Bricker	(forthcoming);	as	well	as	the	various	essays	in	Baxter	&	Cotnoir	(2014).	For	criticisms	of	CAI,	see	especially	van	Inwagen	(1994),	Yi	(1999),	Merricks	(2003:20-28),	and	Sider	(2007,	2014).	2	See	especially	Florio	(forthcoming).		3	The	closest	we	get	are	Sider	(2007,	2014),	Cotnoir	(2013)	and	Hovda	(2014);	but	see	also	Saucedo	(ms).	Sider	seems	to	think	it’s	a	problem	for	CAI,	rather	than	a	virtue,	but,	arguably,	Sider’s	problems	for	CAI	are	avoided	by	the	relational	units	employed	below;	cf.	Bohn	(2011,	2014)	and	Cotnoir	(2013).			
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of	its	philosophical	importance,	I	show	how	this	in	turn	blocks	a	recent	argument	against	 both	 modal	 realism	 and	 necessitism,	 and	 how	 this	 latter	 fact	 can	 be	turned	 into	an	abductive	argument	 for	CAI,	given	modal	realism	or	necessitism	(section	2).	All	in	all,	I	thus	hope	to	show	that	and	how	my	favorite	version	of	CAI	blocks	PCT,	and	that	it’s	a	philosophically	important	fact	we	need	to	recognize,	a	fact	that	can	be	put	to	some	interesting	philosophical	work.			 To	avoid	some	potential	confusion	from	the	outset,	three	things	are	worth	noting	 at	 this	 point	 already.	 First,	 I	 am	 not	 defending	 CAI.	 I’m	 here	 simply	assuming	that	CAI	is	a	coherent	view,	in	order	to	show	that	(i)	if	CAI	is	true,	then	PCT	 is	not	 a	universal	 truth,	 and	 that	 (ii)	 this	 fact	has	 important	philosophical	consequences,	which	I	illustrate	by	the	examples	with	respect	to	modal	realism	and	necessitism	 (presumably	 there	 are	 other	 examples	 too).	Hence,	 it’s	 a	 non-starter	to	object	 to	the	thesis	of	 this	paper	by	objecting	to	CAI	as	such.	Second,	since	 I	 am	 not	 here	 defending	 CAI,	 neither	 will	 I	 here	 attempt	 to	 develop	 a	version	of	CAI	in	full	details.	I	only	develop	a	version	to	the	extent	needed	to	see	that	 it	 will	 block	 PCT,	 and	 how.	 I	 intentionally	 leave	 the	 various	 directions	 of	further	 developments	 of	 it	 open.	 Third,	 to	 the	 extent	 I	 do	 develop	 CAI,	 I	 only	develop	one	version	of	it	(the	version	I	find	the	most	plausible).	Now,	there	are	other	 versions	 of	 it	 as	well,	 some	 of	 them	with	 the	 same	 consequences	 as	 the	ones	I	show	below,	but,	of	these	other	versions,	I	say	nothing.	These	assumptions	and	omissions	are	justified	by	the	fact	that	CAI	is	an	ongoing	research	program,4	arguably	at	a	stage	of	maturity	that	allows	taking	this	program,	or	at	least	some	aspects	of	it	for	granted	in	order	to	explore	its	consequences.		
																																																								4	Witnessed	by	the	growing	amount	of	work	on	CAI	over	the	last	5-8	years.	For	some	references,	see	fn.1.		
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	1.	CAI	BLOCKS	PCT	Let	CAI	 first	and	 foremost	amount	 to	 the	 following	stipulative	definition	of	 the	mereological	term	‘compose’:5			(CAI):	xx	compose	y	=df	xx	are	(collectively)	identical	with	y		where	the	semantics	of	the	right-hand	side	is	as	expected,	namely	‘α=β’	is	true	iff	
v(α)	is	the	same	as	v(β),	where	α	and	β	are	schematic	meta-variables	for	either	singular	or	plural	object-variables,	 and	v	 is	 the	assignment	of	 a	 referent	 to	 the	object-variables.6	The	 corresponding	 laws	 of	 identity	 are	 as	 expected,	 namely	Reflexivity:	 ∀α(α=α),	 and	 Leibniz’s	 Law:	 ∀α∀β(α=β→(Φ(α)↔Φ(β))),	 from	which	we	can	easily	derive	Symmetry	and	Transitivity,	where	again	α	and	β	are	schematic	 meta-variables	 for	 singular	 or	 plural	 object-variables.	 Mereological	composition	 is	 thus	 intended	 to	 be	 just	 one	 among	 four	 possible	 forms	 of	(informative)	 identity:	 one-one,	 one-many,	 many-one	 and	 many-many	 (‘x=y’,	‘x=yy’,	 ‘xx=y’	 and	 ‘xx=yy’).	 CAI	 is	 thus	 committed	 to	 a	 generalized	 concept	 of	identity,	 of	which	 the	ordinary	one-one	 (‘x=y’)	 is	 just	 one	 among	 four	possible																																																									5	As	such	we	no	longer	need	any	mereological	term	as	a	primitive,	since	all	classical	mereological	predicates	can	be	defined	in	terms	of	‘compose’,	which	we	here	define	in	terms	of	a	primitive	generalized	notion	of	identity.	For	the	kind	of	irreducibly	plural	logic	used	throughout	this	paper,	see	Yi	(2005,	2006)	and	Oliver	&	Smiley	(2013).		6	See	Cotnoir	(2013),	Bohn	(2014)	and	Bricker	(forthcoming).	This	stipulative	definition	of	composition	will	of	course	not	convince	anyone	of	the	general	coherency	of	CAI	unless	already	convinced	of	the	coherency	of	the	underlying	primitive	generalized	notion	of	identity	and	its	corresponding	semantics,	but,	recall,	CAI	is	an	ongoing	research	program,	and	convincing	people	of	that	program	is	not	our	present	aim.	We	here	only	explore	some	things	that	follow	from	its	supposed	success.	
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cases,	another	which	is	composition	(‘xx=y’).	The	general	idea	is	just	that	a	whole	and	 all	 its	 parts	 collectively	 is	 one	 and	 the	 same	 ontological	 constituent,	 or	“portion	of	reality”,	just	conceptualized	in	two	different	ways.7	We	thus	see	a	first	sense	 in	which	CAI	 is	 committed	 to	 a	 revisionary	 language,	 namely	 a	 language	allowing	each	side	of	its	identity	sign	to	be	flanked	by	either	a	singular	or	a	plural	term,	independently	of	each	other.			 But	consider	my	body.	Let	a	be	my	body	and	bb	be	my	arms,	 legs,	head	and	torso,	and	assume	bb	compose	a.	Then,	according	to	CAI,	bb=a.	But	a	has	the	cardinal	property	one,	which	bb	does	not;	and	bb	has	 the	cardinal	property	six,	which	 a	 does	 not.	 So,	 by	 Leibniz’s	 Law	 (and	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 cardinal	properties	one	and	 six	 exclude	 each	other),	we	 get	 a	 contradiction.	 Likewise,	a	forms	 a	 singleton	 set,	 but	 bb	 does	 not,	 so,	 by	 Leibniz’s	 Law,	 we	 get	 another	contradiction,	assuming	bb=a.	Also,	my	left	arm	is	one	of	bb,	but	not	one	of	a,	so,	by	Leibniz’s	Law,	we	again	get	a	contradiction,	assuming	bb=a.	What	such	cases	have	in	common	is	that	the	properties	in	question	(e.g.	cardinality,	set-formation,	and	being	one	of)	only	hold	relative	to	a	unique	kind	of	“division”	of	their	subject.	For	obvious	reasons,	Sider	(2007)	calls	such	properties	set-like.		To	 solve	 for	 the	 kind	 of	 contradictions	 we	 get	 from	 such	 set-like	properties,	we	let	CAI	be	committed	to	all	such	properties	being,	contra	what	we	might	have	 initially	 thought,	relational	properties,	 i.e.	properties	 that	hold	only	relative	to	a	unit,	which	I	henceforth	(non-essentially)	assume	is	a	concept.8	So,	
																																																								7	For	a	discussion	of	the	notion	of	”portion	of	reality”,	see	especially	Hawley	(2013)	and	Bricker	(forthcoming).		8	Though	I	will	henceforth	take	concepts	to	be	my	relational	units,	note	that	for	logical	purposes,	any	kind	of	relational	unit	will	do;	e.g.	modes	of	presentation,	or	perhaps	just	contexts.	The	general	idea	is	of	course	a	modification	of	Frege’s	
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for	example,	the	property	of	being	one	in	number	is	relative	to	a	concept	C,	and	the	property	of	being	some	number	larger	than	one	in	number,	say	six,	is	relative	to	some	other	concept	C*.	We	then	get	that	a	(and	bb)	is	one	relative	to	C	(being	a	body),	but	bb	(and	a)	is	not	one	relative	to	C*	(being	arms,	legs,	head	and	torso),	which	 resolves	 the	 contradiction.	 The	 solution	 generalizes	 to	 all	 other	 such	contradictions	that	are	due	to	set-like	properties,	e.g.	those	due	to	forming	a	set	and	being	one	of	some	things	mentioned	above.9	We	thus	see	a	second	sense	in	which	CAI	is	committed	to	a	revisionary	language,	namely	a	language	in	which	a	predicate	we	might	have	initially	thought	was	n-place,	is	really	m-place,	for	some	m>n,	 with	 concepts	 filling	 the	 “new”	 places	 (assuming	 the	 predicates	 are	 to	match	the	structure	of	the	properties	they	express).10			 The	 cardinality	 of	 something	 (as	well	 as	 any	 other	 set-like	 property)	 is	thus	always	relative	to	a	concept	used	to	present	it	with,	a	concept	that	provides	us	with	a	certain	“division”	of	the	referent	of	the	subject	term.	For	example,	using	the	concept	of	being	a	deck	of	cards,	what’s	in	my	hand	has	the	cardinality	one,																																																																																																																																																															famous	idea	in	his	Grundlagen	(1884)	that	cardinality	is	a	property	attaching	to	a	concept.	Cf.	Bohn	(2009,	2011);	Wallace	(2009,	2011);	Cotnoir	(2013).		9	In	short,	and	in	general,	while	F(x)	&	∼F(x)	is	a	contradiction,	F(x,c)	&	∼F(x,c*)	is	not,	provided	c≠c*.	For	the	general	strategy,	see	Bohn	(2009,	2011,	2014)	and	Cotnoir	(2013);	see	also	Appendix.	Wallace	(2009,	2011)	suggests	a	similar	strategy,	but	it	is	unclear	to	me	how	much	her	suggestion	generalizes	beyond	purely	numerical	predication.	McDaniel	(2013)	suggests	that	a	proponent	of	CAI	should	not	relativize	numerical	predication	as	above,	but	just	accept	that	one	and	the	same	thing	can	have	two	different	cardinal	numbers.	But	McDaniel’s	solution	is	insufficiently	general;	it	becomes	simply	incoherent	in	other	cases,	e.g.	in	the	cases	of	forming	a	set	and	being	one	of	some	things.		10	Note	that	by	thus	relativizing	the	set-like	properties,	there	is	no	need	to	put	a	restriction	on	Leibniz’s	Law,	and,	as	pointed	out	in	Bohn	(2009,	2011,	2014)	and	Cotnoir	(2013),	we	also	block	the	devastating	results	of	CAI	for	plural	logic	shown	in	Yi	(1999)	and	Sider	(2007,	2014).	Yi	and	Sider’s	results	rest	on	the	derivation	of	the	principle	Sider	(2007)	calls	Collapse	(x	is	part	of	the	fusion	of	yy	iff	x	is	one	of	yy),	but	the	derivation	of	that	principle	equivocates	on	the	relational	aspects	of	set-like	predications.	In	my	mind,	any	satisfactory	version	of	CAI	must	block	Collapse.	See	also	Bricker	(forthcoming).		
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but	using	the	concept	of	being	cards,	it,	the	very	same	thing,	has	the	cardinality	fifty-two.	None	of	them	is	privileged	in	the	sense	of	being	the	cardinality	of	it.	It	has	 both	 cardinalities,	 but	 relative	 to	 different	 concepts	 providing	 different	“divisions”	of	 it.11	Examples	of	properties	 that	are	not	 thus	relative	 (i.e.	are	not	set-like)	are	mass,	spatial	location,	and	identity.12			 A	 legitimate	 worry	 at	 this	 point	 is	 how	 to	 individuate	 the	 set-like	properties,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 non-set-like	 properties.	 For	 example,	 why	 is	cardinality	 (or	 forming	 a	 set,	 or	 being	 one	 of)	 a	 relational	 property,	 but	 self-identity	 (or	 mass,	 or	 spatial	 location)	 not?	 The	 obvious,	 but	 perhaps	 not	 too	informative	 answer	 is	 that	 the	 former	 holds	 of	 a	 subject	 only	 relative	 to	 a	particular	kind	of	“division”	of	the	subject,	but	the	latter	holds	independently	of	any	such	particular	kind	of	“division”.	For	example,	the	deck	of	cards	in	my	hand	counts	 fifty-two	 only	 relative	 to	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 “division”	 (divide	 it	differently	and	you	get	a	different	 count),	but	 it	 is	 self-identical	 relative	 to	any	kind	 of	 “division”	 (divide	 it	 however	 you	 want,	 self-identity	 holds	 no	 matter	what13).		
																																																								11	Cf.	Frege	(1884).	One	might	of	course	also	appeal	to	the	idea	of	some	properties	being	more	natural	than	others	(Lewis,	1986:59-69),	and	hence	argue	that	it	has	one	of	the	cardinalities	more	fundamentally	(in	some	sense	or	other)	than	the	other.	Though	I	am	sympathetic	to	this	idea,	I	ignore	it	for	present	purposes.			12	Note	that	CAI	is	not	committed	to	the	thesis	of	relative	identity.	Cf.	Geach	(1967).		13	More	precisely,	”divide”	it	into	one	thing,	a,	and	a	is	self-identical;	”divide”	it	into	three	things,	bcd,	and	bcd	are	self-identical,	both	individually	and	collectively.	The	point	generalizes	to	any	kind	of	”division”,	so	self-identity	is	not	set-like	in	the	relevant	sense.	Note	also	that	if	a=bcd,	and	a	is	one	self-identical	object	and	bcd	are	three	self-identical	objects,	then,	assuming	cardinalities	exclude	each	other,	one	might	be	tempted	to	conclude	that	a	both	is	and	is	not	one	self-identical	object,	which	is	a	contradiction.	But	this	contradiction	is	solved	for	by	the	fact	that	the	cardinalities	are	relative,	not	the	self-identity.			
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Now,	 it	would	 take	us	 too	 far	afield	 to	 fully	explore	 the	 individuation	of	set-like	 properties	 here,	 but	 note	 that,	 plausibly,	 there	might	 not	 be	 any	 fully	satisfactory	such	criterion	of	 individuation	of	set-like	properties.	They	might	 in	the	 end	 have	 to	 be	 individuated	 simply	 by	 our	 linguistic	 intuitions	 concerning	the	relevant	 truth-conditions:	does	 the	 truth	of	 this	or	 that	predication	depend	on	a	particular	kind	of	“division”	of	the	subject	of	predication?	If	yes,	it’s	set-like;	if	 no,	 it’s	 not	 set-like.	 But	 note	 also	 that,	 assuming	 CAI,	 the	 fact	 that	we	 get	 a	contradiction	 with	 respect	 to	 some	 properties,	 but	 not	 with	 respect	 to	 others	should	be	taken	to	be	a	good	indicator	of	the	former	being	set-like,	but	the	latter	being	non-set-like.14		Note	finally,	and	importantly	for	what’s	to	come,	that	if	I	counted	what’s	in	 my	 hand	 as	 being	 fifty-two	 cards	 and	 one	 deck	 of	 cards	 and	 from	 that	concluded	that	I	have	fifty-three	things	in	my	hand,	then,	given	CAI,	I	would	have	
double	counted	the	content	 in	my	hand.	That	 is,	 I	would	have	counted	the	same	thing	under	 two	different	concepts,	 summed	up	both	counts,	 ignored	 that	each	count	 is	of	one	and	the	same	thing,	and	as	a	result	 falsely	concluded	that	 there	are	 fifty-three	 things	 in	 my	 hand.	 It	 is	 as	 if	 I	 count	 the	 morning	 star	 and	 the	evening	 star	 and	 conclude	 that	 there	 are	 two	 different	 things	 there.	 Given	 the	identity	between	 the	morning	star	and	 the	evening	star,	 that	 conclusion	 is	 just	
																																																								14	Bricker	(forthcoming)	denies	that	CAI	needs	such	relational	properties,	so	he	avoids	the	above	individuation	problem	altogether.	But,	in	return,	he	gets	a	much	weaker	thesis,	which	is,	in	my	mind,	harder	to	see	as	a	coherent	picture.	In	any	case,	I	take	the	individuation	problem	to	be	one	of	many	interesting	problems	to	be	further	explored	in	the	ongoing	research	program	at	hand.		
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false;	likewise	in	the	case	of	a	deck	of	cards	and	its	cards,	as	well	as	in	the	case	of	my	body	and	its	arms,	legs,	head	and	torso,	given	CAI.15				Of	course,	CAI	has	many	problems	yet	to	be	resolved,	but	I	take	it	we	now	have	a	sufficient	 characterization	 of	 it	 to	 see	 how	 it	 blocks	 PCT.	 As	 just	 shown,	 CAI	comes	with	 a	 revisionary	 language	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 (i)	 it	 contains	 a	 primitive	generalized	identity-predicate,	and	(ii)	many	predicates	only	hold	of	something,	or	some	things,	relative	to	a	concept	that	“divides”	up	its	subject	in	a	certain	way.	(See	Appendix.)	I	now	present	a	simple	counterexample	to	PCT,	as	re-interpreted	
in	 this	 revisionary	 language	of	CAI.	 That	 should	 suffice	 to	 show	 that	 given	 CAI,	PCT	fails	to	be	a	universal	truth.16			 The	 basic	 idea	 behind	 the	 counterexample	 is	 simply	 that	 given	 CAI,	we	need	to	be	careful	when	we	count	our	ontology.	By	CAI,	two	overlapping	things	are	not	wholly	distinct	things,	so	counting	them	both	amounts	to	at	least	partly	double	 counting	 ones	 ontology.	 Of	 course,	 for	 many	 purposes,	 such	 double	counting	is	harmless,	but	not	so	for	the	purposes	of	what’s	in	one’s	ontology,	in	which	 case	 it	 is	 harmful	 to	 the	 truth.	 In	 counting	 one’s	 ontology,	 one	 must	therefore	count	by	concepts	with	disjoint	extensions	on	pain	of	harmful	double	counting.	 It’s	 not	 that,	 according	 to	 CAI,	 we	 cannot	 count	 by	 concepts	 with	
																																																								15	I	here	ignore	in	my	mind	exotic	metaphysical	positions	according	to	which	fusions	constitute	(but	not	compose)	further	objects,	or	substances.	Such	structures	of	constitution	can	be	added	on	top	of	CAI’s	mereological	structures,	if	wanted.		16	More	specifically,	I	do	this	by	providing	a	domain	over	which	we	can	derive	a	contradiction	from	the	conjunction	of	CAI	and	PCT	(as	understood	in	the	slightly	revisionary	language	of	CAI),	which	suffices	to	show	that	if	CAI	is	true,	then	PCT	fails	to	hold	for	all	domain.	I	here	intentionally	stay	neutral	on	the	more	constructive	side	of	things,	e.g.	the	exact	plural	logic	that	should	accompany	CAI	(though	see	fn.10).		
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overlapping	 extensions	 (we	 often	 truly	 do);	 it’s	 just	 that	 when	 it	 comes	 to	purposes	of	what’s	 in	ones	ontology,	 it	would	give	us	a	false	answer:	we	would	count	as	distinct	what’s	not	distinct.	As	we’ll	now	see,	given	CAI,	PCT	is	guilty	of	such	harmful	double	counting;	so	PCT	fails	as	a	universal	truth.		We	write	‘f(xx)’	for	the	fusion	of	xx	(i.e.	the	unique	thing	xx	composes17);	and	‘<x,y>’	for	the	ordered	pair	of	x	and	y.18	Letting	bb	be	a	plurality	of	ordered	pairs,	we	define	the	domain	of	bb	–	dom(bb)	–	as	the	plurality	of	all	and	only	the	first	members	of	the	pairs	in	bb.	We	say	that	some	x	in	the	domain	of	bb	codes	the	plurality	of	all	and	only	the	second	members	of	 the	ordered	pairs	of	which	x	 is	the	first	member,	and	bb	codes	a	plurality	xx	iff	some	x	in	the	domain	of	bb	codes	xx.	We	define	the	predicate	‘among’:	xx	are	among	yy	iff	for	any	z,	if	z	is	one	of	xx,	then	z	is	one	of	yy;	where	‘is	one	of’	is	understood	as	expected:	x	is	one	of	y1y2…	iff	x=y1	or	x=y2	or….	Call	this	definition	of	‘among’,	D1.	Note	that	all	the	pluralities	among	yy	are	all	and	only	the	sub-pluralities	of	yy.	PCT	can	then	be	more	precisely	formulated	as	follows:	there	is	no	plurality	
of	pairs	 that	codes	every	 sub-plurality	of	 its	domain,	 if	 the	domain	 is	 larger	 than	
one:		(PCT):	∼∃xx(|dom(xx)|>1	&	∀yy(yy	are	among	dom(xx)	→	∃x∀y(<x,y>	is	one	of	xx	↔	y	is	one	of	yy)))		
																																																								17	I	here	assume	uniqueness	of	composition,	though	it	follows	from	CAI;	cf.	Sider	(2007).			18	The	following	terminology,	as	well	as	the	more	precise	formulation	of	PCT	below,	is	adopted	from	Florio	(forthcoming),	which	is,	as	far	as	I	know,	the	only	place	that	gives	the	proof	of	PCT	in	full	details.	The	sketch	in	Hawthorne	&	Uzquiano	(2011)	is	too	rough	to	use	to	show	exactly	how	CAI	blocks	PCT.		
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Let	cc	be	 the	 three-membered	plurality	of	ordered	pairs	<f,f>,	<a,a>	and	<b,b>,	where	f	is	short	for	f(ab),	i.e.	the	fusion	of	ab.	We	officially	state	CAI	as	before:	xx	compose	 y	 =df	 xx=y.	We	 know	 from	 our	 earlier	 definitions	 that	dom(cc)	 is	 the	three	(and	only	three)	membered	plurality	fab.	So,	we	also	know	that	there	are	seven	(and	only	seven)	sub-pluralities	of	dom(cc):	fab,	fa,	fb,	ab,	a,	b,	and	f.	Since	we	know	that	dom(cc)	contains	more	than	one	thing,	we	universally	instantiate	PCT	by	our	case	cc,	drop	the	first	conjunct,	and	perform	the	following	derivation:		 1. ∼∀yy(yy	are	among	dom(cc)→∃x∀y(<x,y>	is	one	of	cc	↔	y	is	one	of	yy))	2. ∃yy∼(yy	are	among	dom(cc)→∃x∀y(<x,y>	is	one	of	cc	↔	y	is	one	of	yy))	3. ∼(aa	are	among	dom(cc)→∃x∀y(<x,y>	is	one	of	cc	↔	y	is	one	of	aa))	4. aa	are	among	dom(cc)	&	∼∃x∀y(<x,y>	is	one	of	cc	↔	y	is	one	of	aa)	5. aa	are	among	dom(cc)	6. aa=fab	∨	aa=fa	∨	aa=fb	∨	aa=ab	∨	aa=a	∨	aa=b	∨	aa=f			Lines	1-5	are	obtained	by	standard	plural	and	singular	quantificational	logic,	and	line	6	 follows	 from	5	by	D1	plus	our	knowledge	of	 the	 seven	 (and	only	 seven)	sub-pluralities	 of	 dom(cc).	 Tediously	 running	 through	 each	 one	 of	 the	 seven	cases	of	 line	6,	 and	 instantiate	 the	 second	 conjunct	 of	 line	4	 appropriately,	we	find	a	direct	 contradiction	 in	each	of	 the	cases	aa=a,	aa=b	and	aa=f,	but	not	 in	any	of	 the	cases	aa=fab,	aa=fa,	aa=fb,	aa=ab.	 I	here	only	show	the	two	cases	of	
aa=f	and	aa=ab.		Assume	 aa=f.	 We	 universally	 instantiate	 the	 second	 conjunct	 of	 line	 4:	
∃y∼(<f,y>	is	one	of	cc	↔	y	is	one	of	aa).	There	are	three	and	only	three	cases	to	consider:	a,	b	and	f.	Both	a	and	b	make	both	sides	of	the	latter	bi-conditional	false,	
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and	hence	the	entire	bi-conditional	true,	and	hence	its	negation	false,	and	hence	contradicts	the	second	conjunct	of	line	4.	But	f	makes	both	sides	of	the	latter	bi-conditional	 true,	 and	 hence	 the	 entire	 bi-conditional	 true	 too,	 and	 hence	 its	negation	false,	and	hence	contradicts	the	second	conjunct	of	line	4.	But	there	are	no	 other	 possible	 instantiations.	 So,	∼∃y∼(<f,y>	 is	 one	 of	 cc	↔	 y	 is	 one	 of	aa),	which	contradicts	the	second	conjunct	of	line	4.	So,	if	aa=f,	we	get	a	contradiction.	We	get	the	same	kind	of	contradiction	if	aa=a	or	aa=b.		Assume	aa=ab,	and	universally	 instantiate	the	second	conjunct	of	 line	4:	
∃y∼(<f,y>	 is	 one	of	cc	↔	 y	 is	 one	of	aa).	Again,	 there	 are	 three	and	only	 three	cases	to	consider	as	possible	instantiations	(we	just	need	one	of	course,	but	let’s	go	for	all	three):	a,	b	and	f.	Both	a	and	b	make	the	latter	bi-conditional	false	(by	making	 its	 left-hand	 side	 false,	 but	 its	 right-hand	 side	 true),	 and	 hence	 its	negation	 true;	 hence	 no	 contradiction.	 But	 f	 makes	 the	 bi-conditional	 false	 as	well	(by	making	its	 left-hand	side	true,	but	its	right-hand	side	false),	and	hence	its	 negation	 true;	 hence	 no	 contradiction.	 Neither	 is	 a	 contradiction	 found	 if	
aa=fb,	aa=fa	or	aa=fab.		So,	all	in	all,	a	contradiction	is	found	in	the	cases	aa=a,	aa=b	and	aa=f,	but	not	in	any	of	the	cases	aa=fab,	aa=fa,	aa=fb	or	aa=ab.	But	then,	so	far	our	case	cc	satisfies	PCT	by	at	 least	one	of	the	disjuncts	 in	 line	6	being	true,	and	hence	the	whole	disjunction	being	true.	But	by	CAI,	together	with	the	laws	of	(generalized)	identity	and	collapse	of	redundant	plural	listing,19	line	6	collapses20	into:																																																										19	By	‘the	laws	of	(generalized)	identity’	I	mean	as	before	the	appropriately	generalized	versions	of	both	Leibniz’s	Law:	∀α∀β(α=β→(Φ(α)↔Φ(β))),	and	Reflexivity:	∀α(α=α),	where	each	one	of	α	and	β	is	a	singular	or	plural	term,	independently	of	each	other.	From	those	two	laws,	we	can	derive	Symmetry	and	Transitivity	as	expected.	Note	again	that	it’s	not	Leibniz’s	Law	as	such	that	needs	to	be	relativized	or	restricted	because	the	relational	units	are	built	into	the	
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	 7. aa=a	∨	aa=b	∨	aa=f		But,	as	we	saw	above,	the	cases	aa=a,	aa=b	and	aa=f	are	all	and	only	the	cases	in	which	we	get	a	contradiction	with	the	second	conjunct	of	line	4,	so,	since	we	get	a	contradiction	from	each	one	of	the	disjuncts	of	line	7,	we	also	get	a	contradiction	from	 the	 entire	 disjunction,	 i.e.	 line	 7.	 We	 have	 thus	 established	 our	counterexample	to	PCT,	within	the	revisionary	language	of	CAI.		The	 acute	 reader	 will	 have	 noticed	 that	 in	 providing	 the	 above	counterexample	 we	 never	 appealed	 to	 relational	 predicates.	 However,	 by	 CAI	together	with	 the	 standard	 laws	 of	 (plural)	 identity	 and	 collapse	 of	 redundant	plural	listing	again,	line	6	also	collapses	into:		 7.*		aa=a	∨	aa=b	∨	aa=ab		And	 by	 CAI	 alone	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 accept	 7	 over	 7*	 because	 ab=f.	Interestingly,	there	is	no	contradiction	arising	from	7*,	because,	as	we	have	seen,	
aa=ab	 verifies	 the	 entire	 disjunction,	 i.e.	 line	 7*.	 So,	 by	 collapsing	 6	 into	 7*	instead	of	into	7,	we	don’t	get	our	counterexample	to	PCT	on	the	basis	of	CAI.	But,	of	course,	according	to	CAI,	the	difference	between	7	and	7*	is	a	mere	change	of	conceptualization	of	 one	 and	 the	 same	 thing.	That	 is,	we	have	merely	 changed																																																																																																																																																															substitutions	for	Φ.	So,	since	everything	in	Φ	except	α	and	β	is	to	be	constant	across	both	sides	of	the	biconditional,	LL	holds	as	expected.	By	collapse	of	redundant	plural	listing,	I	mean	that	any	plural	list	containing	the	same	term	more	than	once,	collapses	into	a	list	that	contains	that	term	only	once,	e.g.	abcb	collapses	into	abc.		20	Because:	fab=fa=fb=f=ab.		
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the	relational	units	hidden	in	the	underlying	predicates	involved	in	the	proof	(e.g.	in	the	predicates	‘|	|>1’,	‘is	one	of’,	‘are	among’	and	‘<	,	>’).	By	tediously	unpacking	definitions	 based	 on	 the	 official	 language	 (cf.	 Appendix),	 and	 filling	 in	 the	relational	units,	we	can	see	that	CAI	blocks	PCT	relative	to	one	set	of	concepts,	namely	 one	 according	 to	 which	 we	 double	 count	 the	 whole	 in	 addition	 to	 its	parts	 (cf.	 the	 third	 disjunct	 of	 line	 7),	 but	 not	 relative	 to	 another,	 namely	 one	according	to	which	we	don’t	double	count	the	whole	in	addition	to	its	parts	(cf.	the	third	disjunct	of	line	7*).	In	fact,	we	can	see	this	almost	directly	from	lines	7	and	7*.	More	generally,	it	can	be	shown	that	by	accepting	CAI,	we	can	accept	PCT	just	in	case	we	count	our	ontology	on	the	basis	of	a	partitioning	of	it	into	disjoint	members;	that’s	the	only	way	to	avoid	double-counting.	Given	CAI,	as	soon	as	we	let	 overlapping	 members	 into	 our	 ontology,	 PCT	 no	 longer	 holds	 due	 to	illegitimate	double	counting,	i.e.	counting	the	same	twice	over.21			 In	 sum,	 assuming	CAI,	 there	will	 be	pluralities	 such	 that	 there	 is	 a	map	from	its	members	onto	all	its	sub-pluralities,	and	this	is	so	because	by	CAI	those	pluralities	are	such	that	some	of	their	members	are	identical	with	some	of	their	sub-pluralities	such	that	we	get	that	map.	PCT	thus	holds	only	if	we	either	ignore	those	identities	and	double	count	(which	is	ontologically	misleading)	or	we	don’t	ignore	 those	 identities	 but	 only	 consider	 pluralities	 with	 no	 overlapping	members.				
																																																								21	Arguably,	our	denial	of	PCT	also	amounts	to	a	denial	of	Plural	Comprehension	(PC)	as	a	universal	truth,	the	proposition	that	for	any	non-empty	predicate,	there	are	some	things	that	are	all	and	only	the	things	that	satisfy	that	predicate.	PC	is	formulated	in	terms	of	the	predicate	’is	one	of’,	which	is	one	of	the	predicates	that,	according	to	CAI,	need	to	be	appropriately	relativized.	Unfortunately,	a	full	discussion	of	this	must	wait	for	another	time;	though	see	fn.23.	On	CAI	and	PC,	see	Sider	(2014);	though	note	that	Sider’s	conclusions	look	very	different,	much	less	worrisome,	when	we	invoke	relativized	predicates	as	above.		
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I	take	it	this	much	suffices	to	show	that	if	CAI	is	true,	then	PCT	is	blocked	as	a	universal	 truth.	We	now	turn	to	 two	examples	of	 interesting	philosophical	upshots	of	this	fact	(presumably	there	are	other	such	examples	as	well).			2.	BLOCKING	ONE	THING	BLOCKS	ANOTHER	Hawthorne	and	Uzquiano	(2011)	present	us	with	the	 following	puzzle.	Assume	there	can	be	at	least	two	co-located	point-sized	concrete	objects	in	a	point-sized	region	 of	 space.22	How	many	 such	 co-located	 points	 can	 there	 be?	 Given	 that	there	can	be	at	least	two,	any	particular	number	above	two	seems	objectionably	
ad	 hoc.	 For	 any	 such	 particular	 number,	 finite	 or	 transfinite,	 the	 question	immediately	 arises:	 why	 not	more?	 But	 then,	 since	we	 grant	 at	 least	 two,	 but	accept	no	particular	number	above	 two,	the	 following	 two	answers	seem	to	be	the	only	viable	options:		(P):	at	least	as	many	as	the	alephs	(IE):	not	as	many	as	the	alephs,	but	for	each	aleph	there	can	be	at	least	as	many	as	that			where	the	alephs	is	assumed	to	be	the	entire	series	of	all	the	cardinal	numbers,	having	 the	 absolute	 size	Ω,	 into	 which	 all	 things	 can	 be	 1-1	 mapped,	 i.e.	 the	
																																																								22	By	‘can’	I	here	mean	metaphysically	possible;	by	‘co-located’	I	mean	exactly	co-located;	by	‘point-sized’	I	mean	zero-dimensional	(though	this	is	inessential;	we	only	need	that	it	is	mereologically	atomic);	‘concrete	object’	I	take	to	be	a	primitive,	but	opposed	to	‘abstract	object’;	I	have	no	idea	what	a	region	of	space	is,	nor	what	more	exactly	it	is	to	be	located	in	one.	But	let’s	not	quarrel	about	any	of	this	here.	I	henceforth	use	‘point’	to	mean	zero-dimensional	concrete	object.	The	less	heretic	among	us	could	think	of	these	zero-dimensional	objects	as	concrete	angels	dancing	on	the	point	of	a	needle,	instead	of	as	concrete	points.		
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alephs	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 that	 than	 which	 nothing	 larger	 is	 or	 can	 be.23	P	(plenitude)	 then	 says	 that	 there	 can	be	as	many	co-located	points	 as	 there	are	alephs,	while	IE	(indefinite	extensibility)	says	that	is	not	the	case,	but	that	there	can	nonetheless	be	indefinitely	many.		Hawthorne	and	Uzquiano	(H&U)	presents	two	different	arguments	to	the	effect	that	P	is	false,	so,	given	that	P	and	IE	are	the	only	viable	options,	IE	is	true;	but	IE	in	turn	contradicts	modal	realism	and	necessitism,	so	modal	realism	and	necessitism	must	be	false.24	In	what	follows	I	show	how	to	block	one	(but	not	the	other)	of	their	two	arguments	against	modal	realism	and	necessitism	by	virtue	of	the	results	from	section	1	above.25,26			We	 assume	 both	 that	 composition	 is	 unrestricted:	 any	 plurality	 xx	compose	 something,	 and	 that	 composition	 is	 unique:	 if	 xx	 compose	 y,	 then	 xx	compose	nothing	but	y.27	If	xx	compose	y,	we	also	say	that	y	 is	the	 fusion	of	xx.	
																																																								23	I	assume	that	Ω	is	an	amodal	matter	of	metaphysical	necessity	in	the	sense	of	the	alephs	not	being	tied	to	any	possible	world,	but	rather	being	“outside”	all	possible	worlds	(hence	‘amodal’),	but	nonetheless	holding	true	in	all	possible	worlds	(hence	‘metaphysical	necessity’).	Perhaps	contra	H&U,	I	intentionally	avoid	thinking	of	them	in	terms	of	set	theory.	I	am	also	not	comfortable	with	talking	as	if	Ω	is	a	definite	size,	or	a	mathematical	object	in	its	own	right	(because	then	it	seems	something	could	be	larger),	but	H&U	talk	this	way	(though	presumably	without	any	particular	commitments),	so	for	present	purposes	we	can	and	do	too.	In	any	case,	Ω	is	an	absolute	limit	on	size,	what	so	ever.	24	For	modal	realism,	see	Lewis	(1986);	for	necessitism,	see	Williamson	(2013).	25	Their	other	argument	rests	on	wholly	different	(set-theoretical	rather	than	mereological)	premises,	and	so	demands	separate	treatment,	and	so	must	be	left	for	another	time.	But	just	to	put	my	cards	on	the	table,	I	reject	their	second	argument	too	on	the	basis	of	accepting	unrestricted	set-formation,	but	denying	unrestricted	plural	comprehension.		26	Note	that	the	argument	is	basically	a	generalization	of	the	Russell-Myhill	Paradox.	See	Klement	(1995).	The	general	problem	is	also	lurking	in	Lewis	(1991),	Rosen	(1995)	and	Nolan	(1996).			27	Arguably,	both	these	assumptions	follow	from	CAI.	See	Sider	(2007)	and	Bohn	(2014).	McDaniel	(2010)	and	Cameron	(2012)	argue	that	the	first	assumption	does	not	thus	follow;	Bohn	(2014)	replies.	
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We	say	 that	a	 fusion	 is	based	on	 a	plurality	 iff	 it	 is	 the	 fusion	of	one	of	 its	sub-pluralities;	and	we	say	that	a	plurality	is	disperse	iff	no	two	of	its	sub-pluralities	have	one	and	the	same	fusion.	For	example,	a	plurality	of	mereological	atoms	is	disperse;	so	is	the	plurality	of	all	and	only	the	cats.	A	plurality	of	a	single	cat	and	its	 left	and	right	halves	is	not	disperse,	since	the	plurality	of	the	cat	and	its	 left	half	has	one	and	the	same	fusion	as	that	of	the	cat	and	its	right	half.			 From	 these	 assumptions	 and	 definitions,	 we	 get	 what	 H&U	 calls	 the	
mereological	result:		(MR):	there	are	more	fusions	based	on	a	disperse	plurality	of	two	or	more	things	than	there	are	members	of	that	disperse	plurality	
Proof:	consider	an	arbitrary	disperse	plurality	xx	of	two	or	more	things.	By	PCT,	there	are	more	sub-pluralities	of	xx	than	there	are	members	of	xx;	but	by	UC,	 each	 of	 these	 sub-pluralities	 has	 a	 fusion;	 so,	 since	 xx	 is	 disperse,	there	must	be	more	 fusions	based	on	xx	than	there	are	members	of	xx	as	well.	Q.E.D.			Based	on	MR,	H&U	presents	the	following	argument	against	P:			(A):	assume	P,	 i.e.	 that	 there	can	be	at	 least	as	many	co-located	points	as	 there	are	 alephs.	 By	 MR,	 there	 are	 strictly	 more	 fusions	 based	 on	 those	 co-located	points	 than	 there	are	co-located	points.	But	 then	 there	are	strictly	more	 things	altogether	than	co-located	points,	contradicting	P	or	the	assumption	that	all	the	alephs	is	that	than	which	nothing	larger	is	or	can	be.		
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By	virtue	of	A	(and	the	assumption	that	all	the	alephs	is	that	than	which	nothing	larger	 is	 or	 can	be),	 P	 is	 false,	 leaving	us	with	 IE	 as	 the	 correct	 answer	 to	 our	initial	 question	 (given	 that	 those	 two	 were	 the	 only	 viable	 options).	 But,	according	to	H&U,	IE	contradicts	modal	realism	and	necessitism.		 It	 suffices	 for	 present	 purposes	 to	 say	 that	modal	 realism	 is	 the	 view	according	 to	 which	 all	 possible	 worlds	 and	 objects	 exist	 on	 a	 par	 with	 (or	 as	concretely	 as)	 the	 actual	 world	 and	 objects,	 though	 the	 possible	 worlds	 are	presumably	spatiotemporally	and	causally	 isolated	 from	each	other.28	But	 if	we	assume	 such	 modal	 realism	 together	 with	 unrestricted	 quantification	 over	 all	possible	worlds	and	objects,	i.e.	over	the	entire	pluriverse,	and	the	result	that	IE	is	the	correct	answer	to	our	initial	question,	then	a	version	of	argument	A	arises	all	over	again.	The	argument	 rests	on	 the	 following	observation:	by	 IE,	 for	any	aleph,	there	is	a	possible	world	having	that	many	co-located	points,	so	by	modal	realism,	there	will	be	as	many	such	points	across	the	entire	pluriverse	as	there	are	alephs	(after	all,	since	there	 is	a	world	for	any	arbitrary	aleph	many	co-located	points,	there	are	as	many	worlds	as	alephs!).			(A*):	assume	IE	and	modal	realism.	Then,	by	the	above	observation,	there	are	at	least	 as	 many	 points	 as	 there	 are	 alephs	 across	 the	 entire	 pluriverse.	 By	 MR,	there	are	strictly	more	fusions	based	on	those	points	than	the	points	themselves,	which	 means	 there	 are	 strictly	 more	 things	 altogether	 across	 the	 entire	pluriverse	 than	 alephs,	 which	 is	 impossible	 on	 pain	 of	 contradicting	 IE	 or	 the	assumption	that	all	the	alephs	is	that	than	which	nothing	larger	is	or	can	be.		
																																																								28	For	more	details,	see	Lewis	(1986).		
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	 It	 suffices	 for	 present	 purposes	 to	 say	 that	 necessitism	 is	 the	 view	 that	necessarily,	everything	exists	necessarily.	In	terms	of	possible	worlds,	that	is	to	say	 that	 for	 any	 possible	 world,	 everything	 in	 it	 exists	 in	 any	 other	 possible	world	 as	well	 (though	 it	might	 switch	between	being	 abstract	 and	 concrete).29	But	if	we	assume	such	necessitism	together	with	unrestricted	quantification	over	all	existents,	and	the	result	that	IE	is	the	correct	answer	to	our	initial	question,	then	a	version	of	 argument	A	arises	all	 over	again.	The	argument,	 rests	on	 the	following	observation:	by	IE,	for	any	aleph,	there	is	a	possible	world	having	that	many	co-located	points,	so	by	necessitism,	there	will	be	as	many	such	(concrete	or	abstract)	points	in	actuality	as	there	are	alephs	(after	all,	since	there	is	a	world	for	 any	 arbitrary	 aleph	many	 co-located	 points,	 and	 all	 those	 points	 in	 all	 the	worlds	must	also	be	something	actual,	there	are	actually	as	many	such	(abstract	or	concrete)	points	as	alephs!).			(A**):	assume	IE	and	necessitism.	Then,	by	the	above	observation,	 there	are	as	many	 points	 in	 actuality	 as	 there	 are	 alephs.	 By	 MR,	 there	 are	 strictly	 more	fusions	based	on	those	points	than	the	points	themselves,	which	means	there	are	strictly	more	 things	altogether	 in	actuality	 than	alephs,	which	 is	 impossible	on	pain	of	contradicting	IE	or	the	assumption	that	all	the	alephs	is	that	than	which	nothing	larger	is	or	can	be.			So,	if	everything	is	correct	so	far,	both	modal	realism	and	necessitism	are	false.		But,	 of	 course,	 given	CAI,	 not	 everything	 is	 correct	 so	 far.	As	we	 saw	 in	section	1,	 if	 CAI	 is	 true,	 then	PCT	 is	 false;	 but	 as	we	have	 seen	 in	 this	 section,																																																									29	For	more	details,	see	Williamson	(2013).		
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H&U’s	arguments	against	modal	realism	and	necessitism	both	rest	on	MR,	which	in	 turn	 rests	 on	 PCT;	 so,	 if	 CAI	 is	 true,	 then	 H&U’s	 arguments	 are	 blocked	 by	virtue	of	CAI	blocking	PCT,	which	in	turn	blocks	MR.	(Note	that	CAI	thus	not	only	blocks	A*	and	A**,	but	A	as	well;	so	P	might	very	well	be	true	after	all.)	CAI	thus	provides	 a	 way	 of	 blocking	 H&U’s	 arguments	 against	 modal	 realism	 and	necessitism.		But	 then	we	 in	 effect	 have	 an	 abductive	 argument	 for	 CAI,	 given	 either	modal	 realism	or	necessitism.	Either	 composition	 is	 identity	or	 it	 is	not.	 If	 it	 is	not,	 then	 H&U’s	 argument	 presumably	 goes	 through	 as	 it	 is	 intended,	 since	counting	 overlapping	 things	 don’t	 then	 amount	 to	 double	 counting;	 after	 all,	overlapping	things	are	then	not	in	any	way	identical	things,	and	hence	they	are	distinct,	and	hence	ought	to	be	counted	as	distinct.	If	so,	both	modal	realism	and	necessitism	are	false	on	pain	of	paradox,	as	argued	by	H&U.	But	if	composition	is	(an	instance	of	generalized)	identity,	and	we	understand	that	along	the	 lines	of	CAI	as	articulated	in	section	1	above	(though	presumably	there	are	other	ways	of	understanding	it	too,	which	gives	the	same	result),	then,	as	we	have	seen,	PCT	is	blocked,	and	hence	MR	is	blocked,	and	hence	H&U’s	arguments	are	blocked.	So,	given	modal	realism	or	necessitism	(and	the	two	assumptions	of	the	alephs	being	that	than	which	nothing	larger	is	or	can	be,	and	unrestricted	composition),	one	should	accept	CAI	on	pain	of	paradox!	Of	course,	there	are	many	possible	replies	to	such	an	abductive	argument,	but	my	point	here	is	only	that	we	now	at	least	have	a	debate	up	and	running	due	
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to	the	fact	shown	in	section	1,	namely	that	given	CAI,	PCT	fails	to	be	a	universal	truth.	In	general,	PCT	can	no	longer	be	uncritically	appealed	to.30			
Appendix:	a	sketch	of	the	language	of	CAI			Below	is	a	sketch	of	the	language	of	CAI.	I	also	provide	an	intuitive	translation-function	from	an	ordinary	plural	first-order	language	into	the	language	of	CAI,	to	facilitate	understanding.			
Alphabet:		
Constants:	∼,	∧,	∃	
Non-Logical	Predicates:	Fni		
Logical	Predicates:	=		
Object-variables:	xi,	xxi	
Object-constants:	ai,	aai	 	 	
Concept-variables:	Yi		for	 any	 0<i,	 where	 n	 indicates	 the	 number	 of	 places	 of	 F.	 We	 call	 the	 object-variables	 and	constants	 (i.e.	 excluding	 concept-variables),	 terms.	We	 also	 have	 complex	 terms:	 if	α	 and	β	 are	terms,	then	so	is:	αβ.	Complex	terms	are	associative	and	commutative.					
Well-formed	formulas:		
Atomic:	(i)	Π2nα1,…,αn,Y1,…,Yn	is	an	atomic	wff,	where	Π2n	is	a	2n-place	non-logical	predicate,	αi	is	a	term,	and	Yi	is	a	concept-variable	indexed	to	αi;	and	(ii)	α=β	is	an	atomic	wff,	where	each	one	of	
α	and	β	can	be	any	term	(simple	or	complex),	independently	of	each	other.	
Non-Atomic:	(iii)	∼Φ;	 (iv)	Φ∧Ψ;	 and	 (v)	∃αΦ;	 if	Φ	 and	Ψ	 are	wffs,	and	α	 is	a	 singular	or	plural	object-variable.	(The	other	logical	connectives	and	quantifiers	are	defined	in	the	usual	way.)		
Truth-conditions:	Let	 d	 be	 our	 denotation-function	 on	 predicates	 and	 terms,	 d*	 be	 our	 denotation-function	 on	concept-variables,	and	let	v	be	our	evaluation-function	on	wffs.	Then:		
Atomic:	(i)	Π2nα1,…,αn,Y1,…,Yn	is	true	iff	dΠ2n	is	instantiated	by	<dα1,…,dαn,d*Y1,…,d*Yn>;	(ii)	α=β	is	true	iff	dα	is	identical	with	dβ.	
Non-Atomic:	(iii)	∼Φ	is	true	iff	vΦ	is	not	true;	(iv)	Φ∧Ψ	is	true	iff	vΦ	is	true	and	vΨ	is	true;	and	(v)	
∃αΦ	is	true	iff	Φ	is	true	of	some	dα.			
Translation-function	from	a	more	standard	plural	first-order	language:	
Tr(Πnα1,…,αn)	=	Π2nα1,…,αn,Y1,…,Yn	
Tr(α=β)	=	α=β,	where	=	is	hybrid	n-m	identity	instead	of	the	usual	n-n	identity	
Tr(∼Φ)	=	∼Tr(Φ)	
Tr(Φ∧Ψ)	=	Tr(Φ)∧Tr(Ψ)	
Tr(∃αΦ)	=	∃αTr(Φ)		where,	 intuitively,	Π2n	 holds	 of	 <α1,…,αn>	 relative	 to	 Yi	 holding	 of	 αi.	 (Note	 that	 I	 have	 been	sloppy	 by,	 among	 other	 things,	 saying	 that	 open	wffs	 are	 true,	 but	 if	 you	 are	 still	 reading	 you	probably	 get	 the	 point.)	 In	 particular,	 there	 are,	 according	 to	 CAI,	 cases	 where	Π2n	 holds	 of	<α1,…,αn>	 just	in	case	dαi	has	a	unique	 type	of	 “decomposition”,	or	 “division”.	 In	such	cases	we	can	 say	 that	Π2n	 holds	 of	 <α1,…,αn>	 essentially	 relative	 to	 Yi	 holding	 of	 αi.	 These	 include	 the	important	 relational	 properties	 according	 to	 CAI,	 the	 ones	 that	 solve	 for	 the	 paradoxes,	 and	explain	the	failure	of	PCT	(and	PC).																																																										30	Thanks	to	Salvatore	Florio,	Øystein	Linnebo,	Sam	Roberts,	Gabriel	Uzquiano,	and	several	anonymous	referees	(some	of	which	might	be	identical!).		
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